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In Brown v. Wheeler, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland reviewed summary judgment in a lead-based paint case. The court affirmed the trial court judgment holding in favor of defendant because plaintiff failed to allege or show that: (1) landlord had actual knowledge or reason to know of the presence of chipping, peeling, and flaking lead paint and that such condition was hazardous, and (2) landlord was given reasonable opportunity to correct hazard.
Octavia Brown was born in September 1983. From January 1985 to January 1987, she lived with her grandmother at 2031 East Oliver Street, an apartment owned by Wheeler. In March 1986, Octavia was diagnosed with an elevated blood-lead level. Brown's grandmother testified that she noticed paint chipping from the front and back doors and in several rooms while Octavia lived with her. She also testified that she pointed out this condition to Wheeler when he collected rent. Brown's mother testified that she saw Octavia put paint chips in her mouth in early 1985. An inspection performed in 1995 showed the presence of lead-based paint on the exterior of the house, but the inspection did not extend to the interior. Brown's mother and grandmother sued Wheeler alleging negligence, strict liability, and a violation of the Consumer Protection Act. The latter two allegations were dismissed by summary judgment. After plaintiff’s Motion to Enter upon Land to test for lead-based paint was denied, Wheeler was granted summary judgment on the remaining claims. Plaintiffs appealed.
The Court stated that "in a lead paint poisoning claim based on negligence, a plaintiff must identify admissible evidence that, if believed, would prove that the landlord (1) had actual knowledge or reason to know of chipping, peeling, and flaking lead paint on the premises and that such a condition was hazardous, and (2) the landlord was given a reasonable opportunity to correct the hazard." It also stated "knowledge of a hazard . . . requires general knowledge that deteriorated lead paint is dangerous and specific knowledge that lead-based paint existed on the premises in question and that it was in deteriorated condition."
The Court stated "'reason to know' means that the actor has knowledge of facts from which a reasonable man of ordinary intelligence or one of the superior intelligence of the actor in question would either infer the existence of the fact in question or would regard its existence as so highly probable that his conduct would be predicated upon the assumption that the fact did exist." Also, "knowledge of a condition which involves unreasonable risk of physical harm to persons on the land may not be imputed to a landlord merely from general knowledge that other properties of like age, construction, or design might possibly contain such hazardous conditions. Likewise, "a landlord is under no duty to inspect the premises in order to determine whether such conditions exist."
The Court found no evidence Wheeler had actual knowledge of the existence of lead-based paint in this building or that lead frequently exists in older buildings. Further, there was no evidence Wheeler had actual knowledge of the danger of lead paint or superior knowledge that might constitute "reason to know." The court noted that absent some evidence of actual knowledge to show that Wheeler either knew or had reason to know of the presence and potential hazard of lead-based paint, summary judgment was proper. The court affirmed summary judgment and directed plaintiffs to pay all costs.
Brown v. Wheeler, 109 Md. App. 710, 675 A.2d 1032 (1996).
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