Wilson v. Glenwood Intermountain Properties, Inc.: Tenth Circuit Examines Whether Plaintiff Had Standing to Bring Claim For Gender-based Discrimination Under the Fair Housing Act

In Wilson v. Glenwood Intermountain Properties, Inc., the Tenth Circuit addressed alleged gender-based discrimination under the Fair Housing Act. The court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the defendants' rental and advertising policies, and remanded the case for dismissal based on lack of jurisdiction.

Brigham Young University's (BYU) residential housing system required participating landlords to separate students from non-students in different wings or buildings. Similarly, BYU required that single students without children be separated by sex. Wilson and Walker (both childless) applied for residence with defendants, who own or operate participating complexes. Wilson was refused either because he was a male, a non-student, or both. Walker was denied because she was female. Wilson told two complexes he had a child, and was denied housing because they did not allow children. The plaintiffs sued, alleging Fair Housing Act family status, religious, and gender violations based on the defendants' rental and advertising policies. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The district court held that the plaintiffs either lacked standing or failed to present a prima facie case of discrimination on all of their claims. The plaintiffs appealed only the gender-based discrimination claim.

The Tenth Circuit first addressed whether the plaintiffs had standing on the "refusal to rent" issue. The court stated that "standing under the Fair Housing Act is as broad as permitted by Article III of the Constitution and a party must establish three elements: (1) injury in fact, (2) a causal relationship between the injury and the challenged conduct, and (3) the likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. The court noted that in order to have standing, a plaintiff can simply show that the discrimination deprived him of the ability to compete for the benefit on an equal footing. However, discrimination cannot be the cause of injury to an applicant who could not have obtained the benefit even in the absence of the discrimination.

The Tenth Circuit also noted an exception to the Fair Housing Act for university housing programs. The court found that because the plaintiffs were not BYU students, the ownership and/or operation of gender-segregated apartments reserved solely for BYU students could not have caused plaintiffs to lose the opportunity to rent the apartments. The court then held that, as non-students, plaintiffs lacked standing to bring their gender-based claims because, even in the absence of the challenged discrimination, they would not have qualified to rent the student apartments.

The Tenth Circuit addressed the discriminatory advertising issue by stating that 42 U.S.C. section 3604(c) "makes it unlawful to publish . . . [an] advertisement . . . indicat[ing] [a] preference based on ... sex. . . ." The court found that advertisements indicating that apartments were available only to BYU students of one gender did not indicate a preference, limitation, or discrimination. It noted that unlike the rental discrimination claim, the advertising claim was not determined by the plaintiffs' non-student status, as people may be subjected to discriminatory advertisements whether or not they are otherwise qualified or eligible to rent the apartments. It' also noted that section 3604(c) does not give all persons the express right to be free from discriminatory advertising.

The Tenth Circuit noted that the stigmatizing effect of gender discrimination in housing advertisements could be a sufficient injury to confer standing on persons who merely see the advertising. However, the court classified the plaintiffs as “concerned bystanders” and held their mere receipt of discriminatory advertisements could cause only “abstract stigmatic injury.” It concluded that such injury did not provide the “kind of particular, direct, and concrete injury that is necessary to confer standing to sue in federal courts.” The court then remanded the case with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

Wilson v. Glenwood Intermountain Properties, Inc., 98 F.3d 590 (10th Cir. 1996).

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