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In Miller v. Dep't of Corrections of the State of Illinois, the district court held that a blind plaintiff was not a "qualified individual," as she was not able, with or without reasonable accommodation, to perform the essential functions of the job.
In April 1988, Miller became a corrections officer for the Department of Corrections (DOC). In 1993, as a result of head injuries from a 1986 car accident, Miller had substantial vision loss and was placed on medical leave. In January 1994, a doctor stated that Miller was "essentially blind in both eyes." In March 1994, she met with the warden to discuss her return to work. The warden expressed concern about a severely visually impaired person working at the facility, but said he would discuss it with Central Management. Later that month, Miller received a letter notifying her that her requested return to work was denied, as she might pose a threat to the safety and security of the facility. Further, the letter noted that due to her visual impairment, Miller could not perform a substantial or significant portion of her regularly assigned duties as a correctional officer.
Miller was terminated effective April 1994, and sued DOC alleging violations of the ADA. Miller conceded that she could not perform a vast majority of the duties of a corrections officer. She contended that with reasonable accommodation she could perform the duties associated with the switchboard and armory. DOC moved for summary judgment.
The district court noted that the ADA prohibits discrimination "against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability." To recover under the ADA, a plaintiff must show: (1) that she is disabled; (2) that she is a qualified individual; and (3) that the employer terminated her because of the disability. Regarding "disability," an individual is "disabled" if she has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities, i.e. walking, seeing, hearing, etc. The court found that Miller was substantially limited in the major life activity of seeing. Thus, she was disabled under the ADA.
Regarding the "qualified individual" element, the district court noted that Miller must show that she could perform the essential functions of a corrections officer with or without reasonable accommodation. In determining essential functions, the court examined: (i) the employer's judgment as to which functions were essential, (ii) written job descriptions, (iii) collective bargaining agreements, and (iv) Miller's testimony as to her previous duties. The court found that these factors indicated that the essential functions involved the ability to perform a wide range of duties, most involving the supervision and surveillance of inmates. The court further found that because Miller could not perform, with or without reasonable accommodation, the vast majority of the duties, she was not a qualified individual for purposes of the ADA.
The court also addressed Miller's contention that, with reasonable accommodation, she could perform the duties of a position at the switchboard or in the armory. The court noted that this would involve the restructuring of a position or the creation of a new position. The court found that under the ADA, an employer is not obligated to restructure or create a position, nor to find another job for an employee who is no longer qualified for the job she was doing. Thus, the court granted DOC summary judgment.
Miller v. Dep't of Corrections of the State of Illinois, 916 F. Supp. 863 (C.D. Ill. 1996), aff'd 107 F.3d 483 (7th Cir. 1997).