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In McNemar v. Disney Stores, the district court held that the plaintiff, who was HIV-positive, failed to present a prima facie case of discrimination, as he was not a "qualified individual who . . . [could] perform the essential functions of the job."
In 1989, McNemar was hired by Disney Stores (Disney). McNemar held different positions at several stores, and was eventually promoted to Assistant Store Manager in the Cherry Hill, NJ store. In October 1993, McNemar was diagnosed with AIDS. He told a small group of people, including his manager, Forcey. In November 1993, Ale, the district manager, informed him that she had heard rumors that he tested positive for HIV. McNemar denied that he was HIV-positive.
Later in November, McNemar had store-closing duties, and asked an employee to buy cigarettes for him before she left. He gave her two dollars from the cash register to buy the cigarettes. The employee reported his actions to Disney's Loss Prevention Hotline. Disney had a strict policy prohibiting employees from using store money for personal purposes, and had terminated several employees for using similar amounts of money. McNemar was called to Ale's office and admitted taking the cash. Ale suspended him and asked for his keys and identification. McNemar then told her that he had AIDS. Several hours later, he was terminated. McNemar then sued Disney alleging violations of the ADA and Disney filed a Motion for Summary Judgment.
The district court noted that "McDonnell Douglas Shifting-Burden" analysis applied to ADA claims. Under this analysis, (1) the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination; (2) the burden then shifts to the defendant to offer a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the action; and (3) if the defendant satisfies this burden, the plaintiff must then prove that the defendant's reason is merely a pretext.
The district court ruled that McNemar failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. To recover under the ADA, a plaintiff must show that he is a "qualified individual who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the job." The court found at least two occasions where McNemar had admitted he was not qualified to perform the job of Assistant Manager. First, were McNemar's applications for federal and state disability benefits, in which he and his physicians certified under penalty of perjury that he was "totally and permanently disabled." Second, a physician represented that McNemar suffered from a "total and permanent disability," giving him exempt status on repayment of student loans. The court found that McNemar had been granted benefits and the exemption because of his claim that he was unable to work. The court held that McNemar could not be simultaneously "unable to work" and "qualified to perform the duties of his position." Thus, he was estopped from arguing that he was qualified under the ADA and the court granted Disney summary judgment.
McNemar v. Disney Stores, 1995 WL 390051 (E.D. Pa. 1995), aff'd 91 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996).