Lyons v. Legal Aid Society: Second Circuit Holds That Employer Should Pay for Handicapped Parking Space as Reasonable Accomodation for Employee's Disability

In Lyons v. Legal Aid Society, the Second Circuit addressed reversed and remanded the district court's dismissal as it found that the plaintiff alleged a valid claim under the ADA.

In 1987, Lyons became an attorney with the Legal Aid Society (LAS) in Manhattan. In 1989, she was struck by a car and suffered near fatal injuries. Lyons was on disability leave for nearly four years, during which time she underwent several reconstructive operations and constant physical therapy. After the accident, she could only walk with the aid of walkers, canes, or crutches and her physical stamina was significantly less than normal. Before returning to work, Lyons requested that LAS accommodate her disability by paying for a parking space near her office and the courts in which she would practice. LAS refused, so, Lyons personally paid $300 to $520 for a parking spot near her office (15% to 26% of her monthly income). Lyons sued LAS under the ADA for failing to reasonably accommodate her needs. The district court dismissed the case in favor of LAS and Lyons appealed.

The Second Circuit observed that the ADA prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee "because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." Discrimination includes the failure by an employer to provide reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual. To state an ADA claim for discrimination based on an employer's failure to accommodate her handicap, a plaintiff must allege facts showing: (1) that the employer is subject to the ADA; (2) that she is an individual with a disability; (3) that, with or without reasonable accommodation, she could perform the essential functions of the job; and (4) that the employer had notice of her disability and failed to provide such accommodation.

Under the law stated above, the Second Circuit found that Lyons had undeniably alleged the first, second, and fourth elements. The court found the only question to be whether Lyons's request that LAS provide her with a parking space near work is a "reasonable accommodation." The court noted that the ADA and its regulations do not provide a closed-end definition of the term. The court also referred to EEOC guidelines which indicate that "possible required accommodations . . . include 'making employer provided transportation accessible, and providing reserved parking spaces.'" The court stated that the question of whether it is reasonable to require an employer to provide parking spaces was dependent on the facts and circumstances of each case, including the employer's geographical location and financial resources. Further, the determination involved a "common-sense balancing of the costs and benefits to both the employer and the employee." The court noted that under the ADA, its regulations, and interpretive guidelines, there was nothing inherently unreasonable with requiring an employer to furnish an otherwise qualified employee with assistance related to her getting to work. The court reversed the dismissal as it found that Lyon's complaint stated a valid claim under the ADA. However, the court noted a lack of factual development and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Lyons v. Legal Aid Society, 68 F.3d 1512 (2d Cir. 1995).

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