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An Ohio federal district court addressed an ordinance imposing a one-year moratorium on group homes for mentally handicapped adults. The court found: (1) the operator of a proposed home had standing to sue; and (2) the ordinance discriminated against the handicapped in violation of the Fair Housing Act (FHA).
Epicenter provided housing for mentally handicapped individuals. It operated six group homes in Steubenville (City), five of which were located in the "North End." Each group home could house sixteen people; as a group, the homes averaged 80% to 95% capacity. Epicenter's residents could come and go as they pleased. However, each home maintained a staff of two to five supervisory employees at all times. Those employees, with few exceptions, operated the homes in compliance with state safety and health laws. Epicenter sought to open an additional group home in the North End. To do so, it was required to obtain a license, which further required a building approval by local building and fire officials. Epicenter sought to obtain this license, but the City Manager blocked the inspections because of the City Council's enactment of a one-year moratorium on all new adult care facilities within city limits.
Epicenter sued to enjoin enforcement of the ordinance, claiming it violated the FHA prohibition on discrimination against the handicapped. In March 1996, the court issued a preliminary injunction in favor of Epicenter. A month later, the court issued its opinion.
Regarding Epicenter's standing to sue, the district court noted that any "aggrieved person" may sue to enforce the provisions of the FHA. Aggrieved persons are those who "claim to have been injured by a discriminatory housing practice." In drafting the FHA, Congress extended standing to the constitutional limit (injury in fact). By doing so, it granted standing to housing providers who were frustrated by discriminatory housing practices (citing Marbrunak v. City of Stow, 974 F.2d 43 (6th Cir. 1992)). The court concluded that because Epicenter alleged an injury in fact (i.e., the inability to open another home), it had standing.
The district court noted that granting a preliminary injunction requires a balancing of four factors: "(1) the plaintiffs’ likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether the plaintiffs could suffer irreparable harm without the injunction; (3) whether granting the injunction would cause substantial harm to others; and (4) the impact of the injunction on the public interest." Regarding the first factor, the court noted that discrimination can be proved by one of two means: "disparate treatment," e.g. whether there is evidence of a discriminatory intent or "disparate impact," e.g. whether the effect of a defendant's action is unnecessarily discriminatory even though no intent to discriminate is proved. The court found that the discriminatory intent and purpose of the ordinance were apparent on its face. The court noted the ordinance singled out group homes and was enacted as a result of alleged problems with the handicapped residents at the existing group homes run by Epicenter in the North End.
The court rejected the City's proposed justifications for enacting the ordinance. Under the FHA, discrimination is only permissible if it is justified by legitimate health and safety concerns, or if it is "beneficial discrimination" that extends the principal of equal housing opportunity to the handicapped. The City had argued that it passed the ordinance for three reasons: (1) to buy time to “study other legislation” and provide a “calming down period;” (2) to preserve the public health and safety; and (3) to control a problem of over concentration of mentally handicapped residents in the North End. The court found these reasons were a pretext to exclude more handicapped individuals from moving into “their city.” The court also concluded that even if it accepted the City’s reasons for passing the ordinance, it was invalid under the FHA because it was overbroad.
Regarding the second factor, the district court rejected the City's argument that Epicenter would not suffer irreparable harm if the injunction was denied. The court stated that the FHA "specifically provides that equitable relief is available where there is a violation of the statute... so the traditional showing of irreparable harm is not required." The court also stated that "proving irreparable harm is not an absolute prerequisite to obtaining a preliminary injunction." (quoting Golden v. Kelsey-Haves Co., 73 F.3d 648 (6th Cir. 1996)).
Regarding the third and fourth factors, the district court, found that the residents of the City would not suffer any harm by the issuance of the injunction. It also found the injunction would further the public interest by assuring that handicapped individuals would be mainstreamed rather than remain as or become wards of the state.
The district court found that the factors weighed in favor of a preliminary injunction. Epicenter was not able to show that it would suffer irreparable harm, but it demonstrated that the handicapped community would. Epicenter also showed that there was a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, that the City would not suffer harm from the injunction, and that the public interest favored the injunction. Accordingly, the court issued the injunction. It prohibited the City from enforcement of the ordinance and ordered it to proceed with any necessary inspections and approvals. Finally, the court warned that any attempts to violate the injunction would be met with civil or criminal contempt proceedings.
Epicenter of Steubenville, Inc., v. City of Steubenville, 924 F. Supp. 845 (S.D. Ohio 1996).