In EEOC v. AIC Security Investigations, Ltd., the Seventh Circuit held that: (1) individuals are not liable under a "supervisor liability" theory; (2) admission of a videotaped deposition of the plaintiff was not erroneous; and (3) compensatory and punitive damages against the corporate defendant were not excessive.
In 1986, Wessel became executive director of AIC, a 300 employee company that provided security guards to other organizations. In 1987, Wessel learned he had lung cancer and began five years of surgery, radiation, and chemotherapy. Between 1987 and 1992, Wessel suffered a variety of effects from his cancer and treatment, but was able to continue his employment, essentially full-time. In July 1992, the owner of AIC died and his wife took over. By the end of July 1992, Mrs. Vrdolyak, who knew the plaintiff was ill, terminated him. Wessel filed a complaint with the EEOC which sued AIC and Mrs. Vrdolyak. Wessel intervened as plaintiff. The jury awarded him $22,000 in back pay and $50,000 in compensatory damages. The court allowed these awards to stand, but adjusted the amount of punitive damages (reduced from $250,000 to $150,000), and declared that both defendants were jointly and severally liable on the compensatory and punitive portions of the award. The court also reduced the amount of attorney's fees. The defendants appealed to the Seventh Circuit.
The Seventh Circuit addressed "supervisor liability" and held that individuals who do not independently meet the ADA's definition of "employer" cannot be held liable under the ADA. The court noted that the ADA defines "employer" as "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has 15 or more employees . . . and any agent of such person." The court found that this definition mirrored Title VII and ADEA definitions, which do not allow for "supervisor liability." The court found that the "any agent" language was not meant to hold agents liable for their actions, but that employers would be liable for actions of agents through the doctrine of respondeat superior. The court also and found no congressional intent to hold individuals who did not meet the definition of employer liable. Thus, Mrs. Vrdolyak was not liable for violations of the ADA.
The Seventh Circuit then addressed AIC's claim that the district court erred by admitting a videotaped definition of Wessel, who was actually able to testify at the trial. The Seventh Circuit found that the tape was not duplicative testimony, but provided evidence of Wessel's mental and physical condition soon after his firing, such as his ability to communicate with others. Wessel's condition had deteriorated dramatically by the time he testified, so the tape was evidence that Wessel was still able to adequately perform his job when he was fired, an issue that AIC and Mrs. Vrdolyak hotly disputed. Thus, there was no error by admitting the tape.
The Seventh Circuit observed that with regard to compensatory damages, a reviewing court must determine: (1) whether the award is "monstrously excessive;" (2) whether the amount of the award is rationally connected to the evidence, or the product of the jury's sentiments; and (3) whether the award is roughly similar to awards made in similar cases. The court found a rational connection between the evidence and the award. The court noted the importance of work to Wessel, that he was cut off from a defining aspect of his life, and that he was forced to watch his family suffer emotionally and financially. The court noted that the emotional burden of a person dying of cancer is conceivably greater than that suffered by the ordinary victim of a wrongful discharge. The court also noted that it had upheld similar awards in similar cases and that the amount of the award was not monstrously excessive. Thus, the $50,000 compensatory damages award was affirmed.
Regarding punitive damages, the Seventh Circuit noted that the defendants could not contest the imposition of punitive damages as they had failed to make the proper procedural motions at the end of trial. However, the court could set aside the amount of damages if it exceeded what was necessary to serve the objectives of deterrence and punishment. The court found that the $150,000 was not excessive. The court noted that the punitive portion was three times the amount of the compensatory award, and that courts routinely allowed double and treble damages awards. The court also found the amount was similar to awards granted in the past. Further, the court added that AIC was not a small company and that the award was suitable and necessary to punish and deter a company of its size. However, because Mrs. Vrdolyak could not be held liable for her $75,000 share of the punitive damages, the court remanded the issue for a determination of whether her share should drop out or be imposed on AIC.
Note: On remand, the district court noted that the $150,000 punitive damages award was not excessive as it was only three times the amount of the compensatory damages. Further, it noted that had there been only one defendant, the amount of the punitive damages award would still have been $150,000. Thus, the entire punitive damages award was assessed against AIC. (See EEOC v. AIC Security Investigations, Ltd., (Not reported in F. Supp.) 1995 WL 642775 (N.D. Ill. 1995)).
EEOC v. AIC Security Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276 (7th Cir. 1995).