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The highest court in Maryland has considered whether a leasing representative could be liable under the state's lead paint laws for a tenant's alleged exposure to lead paint while living on the leased premises. To read an earlier Letter of the Law summary of the appellate court opinion in this case, click here.
To summarize the facts, Henry and Rosalee Goodall leased a house from Marilyn Gibson and Eva Criegler (collectively, "Landlords"). In December 1997, the Goodalls were joined by their daughter and granddaughter (collectively, the "Tenants") in the leased premises. Otis Warren Real Estate Services ("Leasing Representative") served as the Landlords' leasing representative. The granddaughter allegedly was exposed to lead-based paint on the Landlords' premises , and the Tenants brought a negligence lawsuit for her injuries. The lawsuit originally named the Landlords and the Leasing Representative, but the Landlords were voluntarily dismissed from the lawsuit by the Tenants. The trial and appellate courts ruled in favor of the Leasing Representative, and the Tenants appealed.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed the rulings of the lower courts. The Tenants argued that Maryland's Lead Paint Act ("Act") requires property owners to take preventive measures to protect tenants from exposure to lead-based paint. The Act defines an owner as "a person, firm, corporation, guardian, conservator, receiver, trustee, executor, or legal representative who...owns, holds, or controls a freehold or leasehold interest to any property." The Act goes on to state the definition of owner includes "any authorized agent of the owner, including a property manager or leasing agent." Based on this language, the Tenants argued that the Leasing Representative fell within the Act's definition of an owner and thus owed a duty to protect the Tenants from exposure to lead-based paint.
The court rejected the Tenants' argument, finding that the Act's statutory language was clear and demonstrated that non-owner leasing agents did not have liability for lead paint exposure. The court found that the Act needed to be read in its entirety, not just the one section on which the Tenants' argument focused. The court determined that the Act's definition of owner was someone who owns, holds, or controls at least part of the property. The Act did not state that a leasing agent was considered an owner even if they did not control part of the property, and so the court determined that these sections of the Act needed to be read together. Therefore, an individual serving as a leasing agent who exercised no control over the property could not face liability for alleged violations of the Act. Since this was also what the lower courts had determined and since the Leasing Representative did not have control over the property, the court affirmed the rulings of the lower courts in favor of the Leasing Representative.
Next, the court considered the Tenants remaining arguments. First, the Tenants argued that the Leasing Representative did in fact have control over the premises because it was able to deliver the premises to the Tenants and also would receive a commission if the Tenants eventually bought the property. The court rejected this argument, finding that a right to receive a commission or the presenting of a lease form to a tenant did not give the Listing Representative the requisite control required by the statute over the property. The second argument made by the Tenants was that the Leasing Representative had enough control over the premises to comply with the Act. The court found no factual support for this argument, and so rejected it. Thus, the lower courts' rulings in favor of the Leasing Representative were affirmed.
Dyer v. Otis Warren Real Estate Co., 810 A.2d 938 (Md. 2002).
Editor's Note: The Maryland Association of REALTORS® filed an amicus curiae brief with the court in support of the Leasing Representative.